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The European Union Act is a good example of a bad law
Jo Murkens argues that the European Union Act of 2011 should be viewed as a failed
statute. Amongst other flaws the Act does not truly empower the people and is legally
inconsistent.
If  there was one area in which the two coalit ion parties needed to produce a workable
agreement as a matter of  priority af ter the May 2010 election, it was the European Union.
The European Union Act (EUA) 2011 contains all sorts of  compromises: it delivers a
ref erendum requirement, but not on the Lisbon Treaty; it af f irms that the source of  the
validity of  EU law is a domestic statute, but without mentioning the sovereignty of  Parliament; it
introduces constitutional saf eguards, but without entrenching them against repeal by a f uture Parliament.
Unf ortunately, the EUA does not ref lect the polit ics of  compromise in a consensus democracy: it ref lects
dissent between the governing parties and within the Conservative party and, in most respects, is a
compromised and f ailed statute.
The EUA builds on a polit ical guarantee in the coalit ion agreement that there will be no transf ers of
sovereign powers until the next election (in 2015). That undertaking was intended to pacif y the
Europhobic wing of  the Conservative party that had demanded but f ailed to get a national ref erendum on
the hated Lisbon Treaty. It also f inds expression in two legal themes that run through the EUA.
The f irst theme redresses the notion of  the EU as an autonomous and supreme legal order by af f irming
that EU law is only valid in the UK because of  the European Communities Act 1972. To that end, section
18 of  the EUA had init ially been conceived as a sovereignty clause (which received a disproportionate
amount of  attention in its draf t f orm). The f inal version is much less ambitious, and all ref erences to the
sovereignty of  Parliament have been cut. (A similar f ate bef ell the UK Parliamentary Sovereignty Bill that
was voted down at the crucial second reading stage in Parliament in March 2011).
Section 18 is nothing more than a declaratory provision that af f irms the validity of  EU law as stemming
f rom section 2(1) of  the ECA (but neglects to address the supremacy of  EU law which stems f rom the
acceptance by the UK judiciary). If  the f inal text of  section 18 was designed to direct UK judges operating
in the post-Factortame era of  statutory interpretation, it f ails to tell them anything they don’t already
know.
The second legal theme relates to the amendment of  the European Communities Act of  1972 with the
introduction of  the novel requirement of  a ref erendum plus Act of  Parliament (this is the most
controversial part), or only of  an Act of  Parliament, or of  some other f orm of  Parliamentary control, with
respect to certain amendments to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) or the Treaty on the Functioning
of  the European Union (TFEU).
In relation to Parliament, its control, scrutiny, and accountability is clearly enhanced over a range of
issues f rom the rights of  EU cit izens (Art.7(2)(a) EUA), and the use of  Article 352 TFEU as a legal base
(Art.8 EUA), to decisions in relation to the area of  f reedom, security, and justice (Art.9 EUA). That is,
incidentally, also in line with the EU’s own provisions to encourage national parliaments to scrutinise the
work of  their respective governments in EU institutions and, in a variety of  ways, to ‘contribute actively
to the good f unctioning of  the Union’ (Art.12 TEU) – which suggests that the EUA is more of  a
cheerleader f or the Lisbon Treaty than a path-breaker f or national democracy.
In relation to the ref erendum requirement, sections 3, 4, and 5 of  the EUA need to be read together and
read caref ully in order to appreciate the ‘signif icance condition’ f or ref erendums which f orms the
centrepiece of  the EUA. Of  particular interest are the three exclusions in section 4(4): codif ication of  an
existing competence (even if  the Treaties need to be rewritten); competences that apply only to other
Member States; and the accession of  a new Member State. Examining only the last exclusion, EU
enlargement clearly involves a constitutionally signif icant amendment: it will, f or instance, impact on the
UK’s weighted votes in the Council. Yet it is exempted f rom the ref erendum requirement because the UK
government f avours enlargement polit ically. These exclusions, although polit ically understandable,
undermine the legal integrity of  the EUA.
There is a f urther twist to the government’s tale about empowering the Brit ish people by giving them, as
David Cameron said in a speech in November 2009, ‘a ref erendum lock to which only they should hold the
key’. It is clear f rom the EUA that all Treaty changes that are to be subject to the ref erendum provisions
require prior unanimous approval at EU level. Should the UK government not support the Treaty change,
it is already empowered to vote against it in the EU institutions; in which case there is no need f or a
ref erendum. The government’s empowerment of  the people has not diminished the government’s own
powers by one iota.
Vernon Bogdanor puts f orward a more radical spin on the ref erendum requirement. He argues that the
EUA transf orms Parliament into a new kind of  legislature, a ‘tricameral’ Parliament that includes the
f amiliar two chambers and, in the context of  signif icant Treaty changes, also the previously ignored
electorate. As a result, Parliament has partially but substantively limited its legislative authority and
unilaterally altered the rule of  recognition (i.e. the conditio sine qua non f or the validity of  law in any legal
system). ‘In seeking to restore national sovereignty, the European Union Act has, paradoxically, restricted
parliamentary sovereignty’. (See Bogdanor’s article f or more.)
This is an intriguing, but also inaccurate, thought. Although the EUA purports to target f uture
Parliaments, they remain unequivocally able to repeal or amend the EUA with a simple majority in
Parliament. The real target of  the EUA is Treaties amending or replacing TEU or TFEU (section 2 EUA)
and the amendment of  TFEU under Article 48(6) TEU (sections 3 and 4 EUA). In short, the EUA does not
(and cannot) unilaterally change the rule of  recognition; but it does seek to condition the exercise of
Ministerial power (section 5, but also ss.3, 6, 7, 8 9, 10 EUA). Finally, the devolution legislation f or
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland also involved Acts of  Parliament preceded by ref erendums.
In sum, the enhancement and extension of  Parliamentary control mechanisms over EU decision-making
are the EUA’s sole redeeming f eatures. In all other respects, the EUA should be viewed as a f ailed
statute. It does not create f undamental constitutional protection, merely shallow and short-sighted
polit ical protectionism. It does not empower the people; it sells them a dummy. Instead of  asserting
Parliament’s ult imate legislative supremacy over EU law as planned and promised at the Bill stage, it f alls
silent on the matter.
In addition, the Act is legally inconsistent (e.g. f or potentially allowing ref erendums on relatively minor
matters), constitutionally pointless (it attempts to bind a f uture Parliament), institutionally botched (it
boosts the powers of  the courts, contrary to what it intended), and polit ically regressive (it undermines
representative democracy by throwing a bit of  direct democracy into the mix). In the long run, it is likely to
be damaging: it will be polit ically very dif f icult to repeal (the Europhobes will make easy polit ical capital out
of  trying to retain the currently hated EUA) and diplomatically very dif f icult to make work and def end. It is
a good example of  a bad law.
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